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1. Introduction 
 
One of the "hot" topics in economics over the last decade was the transition of the 
former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe from centrally planned to 
market economies. Economic transition represents a major challenge for economists of 
different backgrounds and beliefs. Its dynamics has been far from smooth and has 
presented numerous puzzles and surprises. One paradoxical outcome of the economic 
reforms is the emergence of subsistence agriculture in all countries in transition. The 
expansion of subsistence was initially treated as a temporary "side" effect of transition 
and was not paid full attention. Its endurance and its considerable size however, have 
now forced its recognition as a major problem to agricultural development, and it has 
been described as an externality and an important barrier to "efficiency" in agriculture 
(OECD, 1999, Sarris et al., 1999). It is not objective of this paper to present overview of 
these practices, but some FAO (1999) survey data on Bulgaria present a strikingly clear 
picture of the problem: 77.2% of individual farms, 68% of small co-operatives and 40% 
of small private farms do not sell any production. 
The view that subsistence is an outcome of the worsened economic situation began to 
prevail (Tho Seeth et al., 1998; Caskie, 2000). Subsistence farming in transition 
economies has been defined by some authors (Kostov and Lingard, 2000, Kostov 2001) 
as rational economic behaviour with respect to individual utility functions, and also at 
the aggregate economic level.  
This paradox is enhanced by recognition that the small scale farming that gave rise to 
current subsistence agriculture was market oriented in the pre-transition period (Kornai, 
1992). Kostov (2001) presents a detailed analysis of one country in transition, Bulgaria, 
arguing that subsistence farmers are predominantly market oriented nowadays. One 
could ask how it became possible that the reforms which were designed to create a 
market failed to do so and thus contributed to the decommercialisation of agriculture. 
Even the term subsistence or peasant agriculture adds to the confusion. It is a familiar 
problem in developing economies. The comparison between LDCs and transition 
economies however, is  rather  arbitrary and may be misleading.  In the former, 
subsistence is a characteristic of underdevelopment, while in transition economies the 
policy emphasis on industrial development in pre-transition years (Kornai, 1980) gives 
different dimensions to the subsistence problem. This industrialisation created a 
radically different rurality in the present transition economies. The collapse of the 
excessive industrial capacities at the beginning of transition is one reason for 
subsistence expansion (Kostov, 1995). Hence, the phenomenon of subsistence in 
transition economies is not directly comparable with that in developing countries.  
Views about advantages of the market over central planning are rooted in the Austrian 
standpoint dating to the famous debate on the socialist calculation of the 1920s and 
1930s. Another paradox is that these views are often advanced from neo-classically 
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inclined economists. Is it necessary to remember that the predominant opinion was that 
the "socialists", represented by Abba Lerner and Oscar Lange have won the debate. The 
"models" of Vilfredo Pareto (1966), which prove that the results of centrally planned 
and market economies can be identical and the, much criticised by Marxists, words of 
Paul Samuelson that "under perfect competition workers can rent capital goods or 
capitalists can rent workers" (Samuelson, 1972, p.237)  are illustrations of this.  The 
ideas of Hayek (1935) about market co-ordination of dispersed knowledge and the 
market process view of Mises have been largely neglected by the mainstream, although 
they are used to "justify" the logic of economic transition. The approach is still 
dominated by the static timeless neo-classical methodology. This methodology 
encounters huge problems in dealing with transition. Transition is an essentially 
dynamic process of dramatic economic changes which can not be satisfactory handled 
within the static framework of neo-classicism. The mainstream approach is pretty much 
a "magic wand" methodology. One postulates the initial and the final state and they are 
then compared to deduce "dynamic" effects. Little attention is paid to the way the 
system under analysis passes along the route from initial to final state. It simply moves 
there. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that such a point of view has immense 
difficulties in coping with subsistence agriculture. It is conceded that this movement can 
be regarded as consisting of several stages, which are generally viewed in a similar way. 
Since the end states of all these stages should look increasingly similar to the point of 
arrival, subsistence agriculture does not fit into this neat picture. 
One of the features that distinguishes Austrian economics from the economic orthodoxy 
is the view of the economy as a process rather than a collection of end states. This 
property can be exploited in the case of subsistence agriculture in transition economies. 
While in developing countries subsistence can be regarded as "given" and static, in 
CEECs subsistence agriculture has been created by, the transition process. This makes 
the process view a natural and reliable tool in analysing this phenomenon.  
 
2. Institutional framework of transition 
 
It is well recognised that institutional constraints are important determinants of 
economic processes. Transition from centrally planned to market economy means a 
change in the institutions underlying economic activity. Institutional foundations of 
these two economic systems are clearly incompatible and no market logic could apply 
until institutional changes have taken place. The latter requires time. The nature of 
institutions indicates the importance of time. Beginning with the famous dictum of 
Menger about the role of money and the dominant in Austrian tradition view on the 
spontaneous and unintended emergence of many important economic institutions, one 
can understand that institutional development requires time.  
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Transition can be expressed as a process of changing old institutions and creating new 
ones. The incompatibility of many of the institutions of the centrally planned economies 
with the market principles, simply means that changing the old institutions would 
involve their destruction. Destruction is easy compared to creation, and the gap in the 
speed of these two processes creates numerous problems. 
Institutions are interpreted as a social crystallisation of rule-following behaviour 
(Hayek, 1973). They represent the "rules"  that individuals follow to cope with 
uncertainty (O' Driscoll and Rizzo, 1996). They have an information role, providing 
rules and routines that are proved to work in given situations. Faced with uncertainty of 
the future individuals confine their behaviour within these rules. This helps them to 
predict  individual behaviour and to achieve a "pattern co-ordination", a notion which 
better reflects economic realities than the more familiar one of equilibrium. We do not 
"know" the future, but we can "imagine" it, or at least its typical features. The 
institutions represent at the aggregate level the "means of orientation" (Lachmann, 
1971) and their change impacts on the behaviour of economic agents. As Hayek points 
out, institutions represent a stock of social capital. The radical removal of established 
institutions in the initial stages of transition therefore represents a waste of social 
capital, which would have serious consequences for the further development of 
transition economies. Instability is the logical consequence and visible result of the 
destruction of the old institutions. Rules of behaviour, prescribed by the institutions 
destroyed during transition now cease to work.  This increases uncertainty. The process 
of institutional change necessarily brings instability in the observed economic 
behaviour, thus creating instability at the aggregate level.  There are two main  sources 
of this instability. The first is the impossibility to follow the rules of thumb prescribed 
by the destroyed institutions. This is often described as a "vacuum" created by the 
destruction of the old structures and the lack of new ones.  The second, arguably more 
important, source of instability is  related to the informational role of institutions. Hayek 
(1973) argues that patterns of routine behaviour transfer information. Except for the 
restrictions that they impose on individual behaviour, institutions are considered to 
convey knowledge. Therefore rules of thumb can be regarded as workable adaptations 
to the environment. The nature of transition changes the environment. This is the 
essence of transition - to replace the central planning by a new market environment. 
Therefore even  if the old institutions are still in place, the routines of action  they 
prescribe will convey erroneous information which increases the instability. In a normal 
market economy, any increase in uncertainty would give rise to counteracting process 
aimed at creating patterns of institutionally sanctioned behaviour that would reduce the 
uncertainty. In the market process uncertainty can be endogenously created by 
entrepreneurial discovery and later offset by appropriate changes in institutions. This 
reflects both the evolving and unintended character of institutions and their role in the 
knowledge process. We use the word "discovery" to characterise entrepreneurial 
activity. It emphasises the view of the market as a process of acquiring knowledge 
(entrepreneurship) and stocking it (institutionalisation). The institutional destruction that 
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took place in the early stages of transition, precludes the self-sustaining nature of this 
process. The wasted social knowledge can not be easily replaced. Uncertainty stemming 
from radical economic changes can not be reduced unless new institutions are promptly 
installed. It must be acknowledged that the approach to this problem in transition 
countries has been ad hoc. A type of institutional engineering has been applied. The 
latter represents exogenously imposed institutional changes. Exogenously imposed 
institutional changes would ideally be applied to enhance the effect of the basic, 
fundamental economic institutions. Menger's (1963) distinction between organic and 
pragmatic institutions is a useful illustration. We have a different type of exogenous 
change in transition economies. The "foundations" of new legislation and other 
institutional changes are planted onto the economy. In other words the leading role in 
institutional development is attributed to pragmatic institutions. Menger (1963) defined 
such an approach to economic institutions as ahistorical. In introductory textbooks on 
institutions, it is explicitly stated (usually giving as example Latin American experience 
in adopting the principles of American constitution) that such practices are deemed to 
fail. What this "institutional engineering" attempts to do is "save" time needed for the 
knowledge process to develop and yield results. We would like to stress that the effect 
of such externally imposed changes may and will conflict with existing and functioning 
institutions and these frictions would additionally contribute to augmentation of 
uncertainty. 
The rise of uncertainty in transition economies can be seen as a self-enhancing process. 
The loss of social knowledge creates uncertainty, which can not be reduced by new 
institutions, because they need time to evolve and develop. The market economy has to 
be learnt. Many exogenously introduced institutions are "foreign" bodies in the structure 
of the economy and do not help to reduce uncertainty. The market process in these 
conditions leads to a high number of errors and acquiring reliable knowledge is difficult. 
We should stress that this analysis does not apply to the piece-meal changes in China's 
dual-track route, but to the dramatic experiences of Central and Eastern Europe.  
In a normal market economy the disrupting effect of entrepreneurship and the stabilising 
role of institutions are complementary. Entrepreneurship under transition is impaired 
because of the high uncertainty. Whilst in a market economy, enterpreneurship has a 
constructive effect via its role in the knowledge process, in transition the role of 
entrepreneurship is likely to be destructive. When there are large blank areas in the 
institutional structure of the economy, it is much more difficult for knowledge, acquired 
through entrepreneurial discoveries to be transformed into the social sphere. It is in 
entrepreneur's own interest to keep this knowledge private as long as possible. In such 
situation, it is normal to have a large range of rent-seeking activities which are one of 
the main forms of destructive entrepreneurship. 
The errors realised in market process are translated into the transaction balances. Kessel 
and Alchian (1962) argue that transaction balances and short-lived capital goods are 
complements, whilst transaction balances and long-lived capital goods are substitutes. 
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The persistent economic uncertainty of transition is thus expressed in reduction of long-
term capital. Taking into consideration that long-term capital is usually associated with 
the earlier stages of production, leads to a process of transfer of resources from earlier to 
later stages of production. Kostov (2002) denotes the combination of this process with 
high uncertainty and institutional instability as shortening of production in real time. 
The term shortening  can be interpreted  in terms of the stages of production effects but 
also is related to the knowledge process. It reflects that the events that would affect the 
typical features of economic behaviour are less likely to occur. Learning is impaired and 
therefore economic behaviour is more conservative. This means that more importance is 
attributed to rule following behaviour, in response to the lower subjective probability of 
deviating from the adopted rules, than to creative entrepreneurial activities. The main 
feature of shortening compared to the normal market process is its destabilising 
character. In this situation institutional changes are badly needed to realise the missing 
pattern co-ordination. Shortening makes such changes unlikely because of the 
difficulties in learning. When learning takes place via entrepreneurship, the acquired 
knowledge is kept private and thus co-ordination is not improved. It is important to 
stress that the creative role of entrepreneurship cannot be sustained unless the market 
process is properly functioning, that is the institutional structure in established. Under 
conditions of shortening this is increasingly difficult.  
The uncertainty associated with the initial reforms increased the relative importance of 
present consumption relatively to the future. This contributes to enhancing the process 
of shortening. The shortening process  effectively emphasises the later stages of 
production, the net effect of which is a relative increase in current to future 
consumption. Therefore this process takes place when there are expectations for a future 
fall in consumption of the final products. 
The influence of inflation is that only short-term finance is available. This further 
enhances the process of shortening reducing longer term investments. Inflation increases 
the preference of current to future consumption of consumption goods, such as food, 
and contributes to the shortening of agricultural production. The process means a need 
for current food and due to the expected future decline in food production, the danger of 
future food shortages. Both give rise to a tendency towards self-sufficiency. This may 
be expected to be relatively temporary subject to the development of the new market 
institutions. When the new institutions are created the instability is already in place. 
 
3. Roundaboutness and its link to the process of shortening 
 
We can alternatively express the effect of shortening as diminishing the roundaboutness 
of production. This will be true only if more roundabout production techniques are 
superior than less roundabout ones. This is generally the case with subsistence and 
commercial agriculture. The preference of current to future consumption and the 
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ensuing shortening of production in real time leads to a decrease in both future 
production and consumption. The decrease in roundaboutness of the production 
produces the same results. Subsistence behaviour, therefore, can be regarded as 
insurance against the expected fall in consumption. Let us consider the moment in 
which this future becomes present.  Ceteris paribus at this moment the individual would 
have to face lower consumption. He or she would however have a relatively high 
propensity to consume (inherited from the previous period). Another consideration is 
that consumption should be bound below since it is related to the physical survival of 
the individuals. In many of the poorer countries of Central and Eastern Europe, this is a 
major determinant of subsistence. Given the unstable macroeconomic situation 
households face a high risk environment. Their response to instability and uncertainty is 
to try to secure their basic food supply via subsistence production. Self-sufficiency can 
be considered a form of risk minimisation. Economic instability changes psychological 
attitudes and with the possibility of chronic food shortages, market stimuli lose their 
power. The dramatic macroeconomic changes promoted self-sufficiency as a high order 
household  priority and changed  relationships to the market. 
If the decrease in future consumption has been properly expected, then the choice of 
subsistence type of economic behaviour would help individuals to increase their 
consumption relative to the choice of market driven behaviour. That is subsistence has a 
function to maintain consumption at a higher level and thus offsets some of the 
consumption effects of the decreased roundaboutness of agricultural production. It 
further restricts the future consumption for the commercial production and contributes 
to deepening of the shortening process. In the simple model above the variable that 
affects the dynamics is the propensity to consume. In the case of a fall in uncertainty the 
propensity to consume will decline. The latter however may not be sufficient to reverse 
the process. In order to increase the roundaboutness some current consumption has to be 
"sacrificed". This has to be accompanied by expectations for a future rise in 
consumption. Under consumption we understand both domestic and external demand 
for the final products. This would have been the case the effects on subsistence and 
commercial aggriculture were the same. Then, however, there would have been no need 
to consider subsistence agriculture separately from commercial one. The immediate 
response of subsistence farms to changed demand would be more flexible. What they 
need to do is simply reallocate part of their own consumption to the market. This refers 
to unexpected changes in demand. In principle such reallocation would represent a shift 
in the propensity to consume if higher demand is expected. In a world of uncertainty 
and ignorance, however, such expectations have to be formed. The immediate reaction 
of subsistence agriculture to changes in production would not necessary involve 
expectational elements. If the new higher demand stays at this level, the temporary 
character of the change in the propensity to consume may fade out and the "sacrificed" 
current consumption may lead to increased roundaboutness. 
The key to meeting future expected higher demand is in the increased roundaboutness. 
This is a process of reallocation of resources mainly capital from later to earlier stages 
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of production. The capital accumulation in commercial farms, however, largely exceeds 
that in subsistence farms. Consequently changes in roundaboutness of commercial 
agriculture would be much easier and greater than those in the subsistence sector. We 
note the asymmetry in the changes in roundaboutness; while decreasing it may be 
achieved by dispersing capital resources, augmentation assumes capital accumulation 
and therefore is a slower process.  This differential approach is helpful in understanding 
the sources of subsistence. The genesis and expansion of current subsistence farming 
took place in conditions of decreasing  consumption demand and roundaboutness of 
agricultural production. Commercial farmers decrease the roundaboutness of their 
production slowly in relation to the useful economic life of their assets. The process of 
disinvestment in agriculture however had begun long before transition took place. 
(Kornai, 1992, Kostov, 2002) Less roundaboutness and more labour intensive 
technologies simply means more subsistence. 
 
4. Environmental and behavioural entropy 
 
The environment to which economic agents have to adapt during transition is highly 
volatile. This high volatility implies higher environmental entropy. When this is the case 
behavioural entropy should decrease (Heiner, 1983). This restricts enterpreneurship 
which is a high entropy type of behaviour. The uncertainty means that even if there is 
enterpreneurship the chances for reward will be relatively lower.  
Institutions are tools to cope with uncertainty. Transition creates persistent instability. 
Even when the new institutions successfully adapt to the environment, new shocks 
disturb them and hinder the process of institutionalisation. This volatility does not allow 
for long-lived capital goods.  
When production is shortening in real time, both production and consumption are 
decreasing in time. If there are expectations for a growth of the market, which include 
both domestic and external  market, than there will be adjustments in the production 
process to meet this increased demand. The income driven domestic market increase (or 
expectations for such) will have a similar effect of reversing the tendency towards 
shortening. 
The informational role of institutions aimed at reducing  uncertainty can be alternatively 
expressed as reducing the environmental entropy. Routinised behaviour therefore 
reduces  the behavioural entropy. Heiner (1983) showed that although behavioural and 
enviromental entropy are  positively correlated, increasing the latter beyond a certain  
limit leads to a decline in behavioural entropy. To put it simply, the market process 
cannot properly work unless the degree of uncertainty is sufficiently low. Low 
environmental entropy, that is relatively low uncertainty, allows for low entropy type of 
behaviour. Entrepreneurship not only increases behavioural entropy, it is "creative 
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destruction" which alters the environment. Thus entrepreunership increases 
environmental entropy and via the positive feedback to economic behaviour creates 
conditions for more innovative activities. Note that this positive feedback is also a form 
of entrepreneurship. While the disturbing role of entrepreneurship may be related to the 
Shumpeterian entrepreneur, the constructive entrepreneurship is more compatible with 
entrepreneurship a la Kirzner. Both are needed for the market process to operate. In a 
lower entropy environment, the creative entrepreneurship prevails. The lower 
uncertainty creates a relative stability that allows the entrepreneurs to see and seize the 
opportunities. Their alertness is an automatic build-in constraint to the disruptive effects 
of entrepreneurship. These disruptive effects create new opportunities, which are seized 
by other enrepreneurs. The relative stability of the environment ensures that the overal 
effect of entrepreneurship is stabilising. When environmental uncertainty increases 
above the above mentioned limit this forces the system to switch from positive to 
negative feedback. Higher entropy in this case requires a lower entropy economic 
behaviour and this restricts creative entrepreneurship. The meaning of the negative 
feedback is that due to the high uncertainty the constructive entrepreneurship is less 
likely. The high uncertainty would prevent many entrepreneurs from clearly seeing 
existing opportunities. The uncertainty would lead to a greater number of entrepreneurs 
acting on non-existing opportunities and thus further increasing uncertainty. The 
incomplete market structure in transition economies hinders efficient information flows 
and makes corrections of erroneous action more difficult. Therefore in transition the 
economy may get "locked" in higher entropy environment. The negative feedbacks are 
prevailing and low entropy economic behaviour is dominant. Therefore in these 
conditions, knowledge process cannot be guaranteed to operate as smoothly as above 
and entrepreunership can be destructive. Subsistence economic behaviour, due to its 
short in real time production cycle, is more predictable than commercial, which means 
that high volatility in the economic and social environment would lead to augmentation 
of the relative importance of subsistence agriculture. 
 
5. What Determines Subsistence Agriculture in Transition 
Economies? 
 
Simon (1981) notes that individual plans and perceptions are hierarchical and so are the 
institutions, which are intentionally and unintentionally "designed" to facilitate the 
implementation of individual plans. Economic transition is about the change in higher  
ranked institutions. This change brings about greater instability, because it affects the 
most typical features of economic events. It disturbs the established  pattern co-
ordination. Subsistence  agriculture is situated at lower levels in the hierarchy of the 
institutions. Following Langlois (1986) who suggests that when actions are co-ordinated 
at the higher level in the hierarchy, agents  use the freed energy to examine possible 
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behavioural changes at the lower levels in the same hierarchy, we can now explain 
subsistence endurance. First the macroeconomic parameters reflect the volatility due to 
changes in the fundamental institutions, that is those, which are high in the hierarchy.  
That is the apparent stability does not imply that all the needed  institutional 
arrangements are in place and working.  Institutional change is a much wider process. 
Many of the new institutions were created during economic turmoil. When the 
environmental entropy decreases, these institutions have to further adapt to this new 
environment. Whilst establishing stability high in the institutional hierarchy frees energy 
to be implemented at the lower levels, does this means that  the subsistence structure 
will be changed? The answer is yes. Self-sufficiency is evidently ranked lower than 
general consumption behaviour. This means that changes in subsistence have to be 
conditioned upon obtaining a stable and co-ordinated consumption pattern. A common 
measure for consumption volatility is the demand price elasticity. Referring to 
subsistence, we are interested in price elasticity of food consumption. When incomes are 
low, these elasticities and food consumption volatility are higher and there is little 
energy to be  applied to changing  self-sufficiency. The income situation therefore is an 
important determinant of subsistence agriculture, because it describes its institutional 
environment.  
Subsistence type behaviour, however is not only "consume what you have produced", 
but also "produce what you want to consume". That is we have to also  situate it within 
the overall food production institutional environment. It consists of agricultural 
production and food-processing. It is well known that agricultural production is in 
general relatively price inelastic. Food processing however depends on both domestic 
and external demand for its products and is much more volatile. Consequently 
producing for food processing is a different kind of production compared to production 
which is aimed at immediate consumption. It assumes different plans.  The existence of 
subsistence restricts the domestic market for the products of food processing. Therefore 
external markets are crucial in changing subsistence farming when regarded from its 
production side.  
Another difference between incomes situation and external markets is that  while the 
former acts directly, the latter has a much more subtle and indirect influence. An 
increase in the external market for raw agricultural products would also contribute to 
commercialisation of agriculture. This means that the relatively inelastic production 
cannot meet the higher demand and some of the production aimed at self-sufficiency 
might have to be reallocated to the market. If this growth is expected to be irreversible, 
then some resources would be moved from later to earlier stages of production. This 
would lead to "expanding" production in real time. This would increase future 
production and consumption. In relation to the subsistence consumption, this process 
may restore the original level of consumption, part of which may be "sacrificed" to 
launch the process of resources' reallocation. 
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The issue of capital accumulation and amortisation is important to the future 
development of agriculture. Traditionally capital production models include production 
of capital goods as separate phase of production process. We can regard monetary funds 
as a liquid form of capital. This means that when capital is exogenised from the 
production process, money can be interpreted as capital. Accumulating money is simply 
another form of capital accumulation. New capital can be brought into the production 
process against money, which is similar to the substitution of specific capital. Loans can 
be used to introduce new capital. The latter have to be ensured by collateral. In this 
relation loans can be regarded as intertemporal substitution of specific capital. At the 
beginning of transition, agriculture is characterised by declining in economic terms 
capital goods. This restricted the financial abilities of production units. Subsistence 
agriculture is particularly deprived of accumulated capital. This suggests that the 
process of commercialisation would require bringing  in agriculture capital resources 
from outside.  An example may be to use of houses as a collateral. The latter needs 
some pre-requisites. The first is that there has to be stability in the prime use of these 
assets. The uncertainty, general and specific to the domains of prime use (e.g. housing) 
and transfer (that is agriculture) of the asset, must be sufficiently low. Expectations 
about increase in consumption of the final produced good have to be present. 
Understanding economic development as a process of cumulative causation contributes 
to our interpretation of the role of subsistence agriculture in transition economies, which 
Kostov and Lingard (2000) define  as a "market clearing mechanism". Agricultural 
production in general is characterised by a low price responsiveness. The demand for 
food products, however depends on the income situation. In developed market 
economies, it is less responsive to price changes. In lower income countries one should 
normally expect considerable price responsiveness of food demand. In this situation the 
significant price changes that took place during transition would have destabilising 
effects on the total agricultural economy, because changes in production would lag far 
behind the changes in consumption. Furthermore such changes have to recognise the 
budget constraints, which in some countries will be clearly binding. Subsistence 
agriculture  is the solution to this problem. It supplies major part of the population with 
food, that is withdraws some demand from the market. Employing backward and labour 
intensive technologies, it restricts potential agricultural production growth. In terms of 
expanding subsistence this implies that people are driven out of the market and 
simultaneously market supplies (that is agricultural production) are decreased. The 
above process stabilises the food market in conditions of declining domestic purchasing 
power. For the net agricultural exporters (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania) the restrictions 
on export opportunities contribute to subsistence expansion. Most CEECs are however 
net agricultural importers. Small scale production in these countries therefore has to be 
compared to an enlarged market dependent on both domestic demand and imports. In 
this case subsistence production should be regarded as a basis for import replacement. 
Agricultural decomercialisation in these countries is a consequence of their  increased 
import exposure.  
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6. Conclusions  
 
The process of economic reforms has peculiarities in every country in transition. These 
specifics have influenced the character and the relative size of subsistence in these 
countries. The main reason for its existence and endurance is however the process of 
transition. Drastic institutional changes caused subsistence agriculture. It can not be 
regarded as temporary and "inefficient" phenomenon (Sarris et al., 1999, OECD, 1999). 
Subsistence is the reaction of the agricultural economy to the abrupt institutional 
changes. 
The expansion of subsistence took place as a result of economic developments of 
commercial agriculture and therefore does not contradict market process logic. The view 
that subsistence agriculture is a perverse result of market reforms is a reflection of lack 
of understanding of how markets operate. It is however desirable to achieve agricultural 
commercialisation. Nevertheless agricultural commercialisation can not be  regarded as 
a separate policy aim, because its extent and effectiveness will depend on the 
institutional characteristics of the market, which would allow for full development of 
the market process. We have outlined the most important factors likely to influence this 
process. The first is the income situation. Income impacts not only on domestic demand 
for agricultural products, but also the institutional development.  
The other  factor for agricultural commercialisation are the external markets for 
agricultural and food products. Kostov and Lingard (2000) define the "market clearing" 
role of subsistence with regard to foreign markets in the case of export oriented 
economy. Except for Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, the CEECs are net agricultural 
importers. Thus it might be useful to generalise analysis to include foreign trade. The 
stabilising role of subsistence would be valid if there are stagnating exports and there 
are insufficient constraints on imports.  These restrict the size of market which inhibits 
the process of agricultural commercialisation similarly to Adam Smith's famous dictum 
about the division of labour. Therefore foreign trade developments may contribute to 
reversing the process by creating additional market opportunities. 
The third factor that would influence agricultural commercialisation is the process of 
capital accumulation. Capital accumulation as a basis for the production process is often 
neglected in orthodox economic analysis. The role of money as a universal form of 
capital relates the commercialisation to the income situation. That is the role of income 
for capital accumulation and for production growth is related to general economic 
development. One can view the substitution between different kinds of specific capital 
that contributes to agricultural capital accumulation as another facet of the same process. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that transition economies are often included in the 
group of "emerging economies". This suggests that they are still not fully pledged 
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market economies. The market, as Hayek (1935) in the discussions on socialist planning 
saw it, is a process of co-ordinating dispersed social knowledge. In this sense market 
does not exist in most countries in transition. The market would need a sufficient 
stability and developed institutions to exercise its co-ordination role. The assumed in 
neo-classical economics perfect competition, is an image of absolute stability and 
determinedness, that is the end of any market, because in such conditions, there is no 
need for market. Centrally planned economy was almost diametrically opposite to the 
market one (Kornai, 1980, 1992). The process of transition therefore presents a major 
challenge to economic analuysis. The tools of analysis has to be expanded to situations 
which diverge from the adopted understanding of market. The object of analysis are not 
any longer the familiar markets. Transition economies combine elements of the old 
central planning and the new market system. This a totally new world, where surprises 
are everyday business. We can overcome these surprises only by obtaining better and 
fuller understanding of underlying processes.  
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